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Abstract: An independent element in the investigation of complaints against police officers was first 
introduced in the United Kingdom in 1964. It first appeared in Ireland in 1986. Over the following 
years the independent element has been strengthened on several occasions in response in response to 
persistent concerns that it was not delivering effective accountability. In this paper I consider why the 
latest round of reforms is continuing to disappoint. Key factors would appear to be: continued reliance on 
internal police investigators and technical expertise; lack of rigour in investigations; regulatory capture; 
police obstructionism; and lack of resources. Further reforms are suggested.
INTRODUCTION
Organised police forces first appeared in the 
British and Irish islands in Dublin in 1786 
(Walsh, 1998). It was 1964, however, before any 
concession was made to independent oversight of 
how complaints against the police were handled 
on a regular basis (Smith, 2005). Until then such 
complaints were a matter for the relevant chief 
of police, subject always to the possibility of a 
complainant pursuing a civil action through the 
courts.
Over the past 50 years all four jurisdictions 
(Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, England 
and Wales, and Scotland) have advanced towards 
the independent investigation of complaints, 
albeit in a piecemeal and, to some extent, cyclical 
manner (Smith, 2005). Typically the reforms in 
each jurisdiction have been driven by periodic 
crises of confidence in policing practices and/or the 
compensatory flip side of government proposals 
to expand police powers. Despite some significant 
jurisdictional differences in police structures, the 
reforms have all converged around a common 
model which, at least superficially, espouses the 
independent investigation of complaints. Yet the 
problem of public confidence in how complaints 
against the police are handled still persists in at 
least three of the four jurisdictions. In the fourth, 
Scotland, the reforms are too recent to make any 
definitive judgement on their efficacy.
In this paper I attempt to identify why independent 
investigation has not succeeded in rendering 
police officers accountable for corrupt and/or 
abusive conduct, and to offer some suggestions 
for the next cycle of reforms. By way of setting the 
context, I will begin with an outline of the historical 
landmarks in the development of independent 
investigation, the essential substance and shape 
of the current procedures and examples of the 
ongoing concerns.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
INDEPENDENT ELEMENT
For much of their existence, British and Irish police 
forces have jealously guarded their exclusive 
power to deal with criminal and disciplinary 
complaints against the conduct of their officers. 
The first chink into their domain was the very 
modest provision in the Police Act 1964 which 
imposed a duty on the independent Inspectorate 
of Constabulary (HMIC) and the democratically 
elected Police Authorities to keep themselves 
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informed of the manner in which Chief Constables 
in England and Wales and in Scotland handled 
complaints against their officers from members 
of the public (1). Similar, although not identical, 
provision was made for Northern Ireland in 
1970 (2). While Chief Constables were subject to 
a statutory obligation to record and investigate 
individual complaints, the actual investigation 
and disposal remained under their control.
The next and most critical development occurred 
in the mid-1970s when an independent Police 
Complaints Board was established for England 
and Wales (3), followed one year later by a 
similar development in Northern Ireland (4). 
This was the first time in the history of policing 
in Britain and Ireland that provision was made 
for an independent element in the handling of 
individual complaints against the police. Staunch 
police resistance to the basic principle, however, 
ensured that the balance of power remained 
firmly in police hands. (Mark, 1979; Cohen, 1985; 
Humphry, 1979) The role of the independent 
Board was confined largely to ex post facto review 
of how an individual investigation was carried 
out by the police themselves. However, if it was 
unhappy with a police decision not to proceed 
with disciplinary charges in a case, it could direct 
the police chief in question to refer the case to 
a disciplinary tribunal which included Board 
members.
Not surprisingly, the Boards had little impact on 
the outcome of complaints or on the confidence 
of complainants or the public generally in the 
new procedure. (Lustgarten, 1986; Humphry, 
1979; Cohen, 1985; Bennett, 1979) The Boards 
rarely directed a Chief Constable to refer cases 
to a tribunal, and the annual success rate for 
complaints averaged around five percent. 
While there will always be a proportion of false, 
exaggerated or inadmissible complaints, that still 
leaves a very large number of genuine complaints 
which did not succeed.
The next cycle of reforms was triggered in the 
1980s. The Board in England and Wales was 
reformed and renamed the Police Complaints 
Authority (5). Similar changes were effected 
in Northern Ireland where the Board was 
renamed the Independent Commission for 
Police Complaints (6). The reforms reflected 
a further tentative step towards independent 
investigation. As well as conducting ex post facto 
reviews of how complaints were handled, they 
could now supervise the police investigation of 
some complaints, as well as direct the relevant 
police chief to prefer disciplinary charges in any 
appropriate case where it disagreed with his 
decision not to prefer such charges. The Republic 
of Ireland also entered the field at this point with 
the establishment of an independent Complaints 
Board and procedure similar to the remodelled 
versions in England and Wales and Northern 
Ireland (7). Indeed, it went further by including 
provision for the Board to: investigate without 
the need for a prior complaint; investigate 
systemic issues triggering complaints; and, most 
significantly, conduct its own investigations 
independently of the police in exceptional cases 
(Walsh, 1998).
Once again, the reforms disappointed. Even the 
ridiculously low success rates remained a feature 
in each of the three jurisdictions (Smith, 2005; 
Dickson, 1990; Committee on the Administration 
of Justice, 1993; Walsh, 2009). In the Republic of 
Ireland, the Complaints Board’s unprecedented 
power to conduct wholly independent 
investigations was used only once in its lifetime 
which spanned the processing of over 22 000 
complaints (Walsh, 2009). The single case 
involved the extensive use of police violence in 
dealing with a ‘Reclaim the Streets’ rally in Dublin 
on May Day 2002. The events were caught on 
camera and widely publicised through media 
broadcasts. The Board’s unprecedented move 
to conduct an independent investigation was 
heavily prompted by the public outcry. The 
results, however, were deeply disappointing, as 
the progress of the investigation was impeded 
by a lack of cooperation from police officers on 
the ground during the protest. (GSCB, 2003, and 
Walsh, 2009).
(1) Police Act 1964, s.50.
(2) Police Act (Northern Ireland) 1970, s.12. There was provision for the establishment of an independent tribunal to determine 
a complaint in any individual case, but it was only ever used once (Walsh, 1983).
(3) Police Act 1976.
(4) Police (Northern Ireland) Order 1977.
(5) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Part IX.
(6) Police (Northern Ireland) Order 1987.
(7) Garda Síochána (Complaints) Act 1986.
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The latest advances in the direction of independent 
investigation were born largely out of the need 
to address the deep alienation from the police 
of one section of the divided community in 
Northern Ireland. In a penetrating and persuasive 
report commissioned by the Northern Ireland 
government in 1995, Maurice Hayes proposed the 
establishment of an Office of Police Ombudsman 
(OPONI) with radical powers of independent 
investigation (Hayes, 1997). In many substantial 
aspects the Hayes proposals were ahead of the 
curve. It was not until 2009 that the European 
Commissioner for Human Rights produced an 
opinion on human rights based best practice in 
the independent and effective determination 
of complaints against the police (Hammerburg, 
2009). Based largely on the evolving jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights since the 
late 1990’s, the opinion is heavily reflective of the 
principles underpinning the Hayes report.
The OPONI was provided for by the Police 
(Northern Ireland) Act 1998 and was established 
in 2000. Prompted partly by the ECtHR 
jurisprudence, England and Wales introduced 
reforms in the same direction in 2002 with a 
multi-member Independent Police Complaints 
Commission (IPCC) (8). A combination of the 
European Court’s jurisprudence and a crisis of 
public confidence in the police and in the police 
complaints system, compelled the Republic of 
Ireland to provide for a similar multi-member 
Ombudsman Commission in the Garda Síochána 
Act 2005 (Conway, 2009; Walsh, 2004a; 2004b). 
It opened for business in 2007. Finally, Scotland 
came later to the independent investigation of 
complaints, outside of criminal allegations. To 
some extent this can be attributed to significant 
differences in criminal procedure between 
Scotland and the other jurisdictions. Outside of 
the role of the independent Procurator Fiscal in 
criminal matters, provision for an independent 
review mechanism was first made in Scotland 
in the Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice 
(Scotland) Act 2006. The Police Complaints 
Commissioner for Scotland, established pursuant 
to that Act, was renamed the Police Investigations 
and Review Commissioner (PIRC) in 2013, pursuant 
to the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012. 
The PIRC has independent powers of investigation 
in respect of certain serious complaints; similar 
in some respects to those of the other police 
complaints bodies.
THE LATEST REFORMS
The latest reforms differ in some detail across 
the four jurisdictions, but they are similar in 
most of the essential aspects. Broadly they all 
purport to offer the prospect of complaints 
being investigated entirely independently of the 
police. The Ombudsman in Northern Ireland, 
for example, is appointed by the Prime Minister 
following an open competition. He or she cannot 
be a former police officer, and the independence 
of the office is statutorily guaranteed. Similar 
arrangements apply to the members of the 
Commissions in the other jurisdictions, with 
the notable exception of the Republic of Ireland 
where the process lacks transparency. The 
members of the Garda Síochána Ombudsman 
Commission are appointed by the President on 
the nomination of the government and with the 
approval of the House of Parliament. In practice, 
however, the nominations are chosen secretly by 
the Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence (the 
same Minister with responsibility for policing) 
with no independent interviews or open 
competition. It is also worth noting that none of 
the appointments procedures are fully compliant 
with the best human rights based practice, as 
set out in the opinion of the European Human 
Rights Commissioner. This stipulates that the 
Ombudsman or Commission members should be 
appointed by, and accountable to, the relevant 
legislative assembly (Hammerburg, 2009).
Critically, the Ombudsman and Commissions 
recruit and train their own investigative staff. 
Equally important and unprecedented is the 
fact that they can exercise the same powers of 
arrest, detention, interrogation, entry, search and 
seizure etc. as police officers. In effect they are 
the equivalent of police officers whose function is 
confined to investigating the alleged infractions 
of conventional police officers. In those cases 
actually investigated by the independent 
investigators, the investigation reports are 
submitted directly to the Ombudsman or 
Commission which generally can decide whether 
to: refer the file on to the independent public 
prosecutor; recommend disciplinary charges to 
the relevant police chief; trigger a local or informal 
resolution procedure; or take no further action. 
The powers of the Scottish PIRC are more limited 
in these matters than those of the other bodies. 
It is also worth noting that the Ombudsman 
and Commissions have the power to initiate 
(8) Police Reform Act 2002, Part 2.
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investigations into alleged incidents in certain 
circumstances, even where no formal complaint 
has been lodged. Equally, they can be authorised 
to investigate systemic issues that are generating 
complaints. On the other hand, their role does 
not extend beyond investigation and report, 
even with respect to individual complaints. In 
those cases where they uphold a complaint, it 
is a matter for the independent prosecutor to 
decide whether to prefer criminal charges, and/
or for the chief of police to decide whether to 
prefer disciplinary charges. If criminal charges 
are preferred, they will be determined through 
the independent courts in the same manner as 
any other criminal charge. If disciplinary charges 
are preferred they are determined through 
the internal police disciplinary process. The 
Ombudsman or Commissions have no direct role 
in these matters or their outcome.
It should be noted that these powers of 
independent investigation, where applicable, 
are generally in addition to the role of the 
Commissions in reviewing, supervising and 
managing the investigation of complaints which 
are not handled in this manner.
Superficially, the current arrangements satisfy 
the ECHR standards, although there may be 
some doubt over the lack of independence in 
the final determination of criminal or disciplinary 
charges arising out of deaths or serious injuries. 
The opinion of the European Commissioner on 
Human Rights acknowledges that the established 
working relationship between the police and 
the independent public prosecutor may give 
rise to the appearance of bias in favour of the 
police in complaints cases. Accordingly, the 
opinion recommends an arrangement whereby 
the independent ombudsman/commission can 
prefer criminal charges (Hammerburg, 2009). 
Surprisingly, no mention is made in the opinion 
of the more obvious lack of independence in the 
decision whether to prefer disciplinary charges 
(which remains with the police). However, it 
does state that the independent prosecutor, 
police and/or ombudsman commission should 
give reasons for all decisions on criminal or 
disciplinary matters (Hammerburg, 2009). Each 
of the four jurisdictions remains particularly weak 
on this aspect.
ONGOING CONCERNS
In the historical context of police complaints 
procedures in Britain and Ireland, the latest 
reforms appear quite radical. In practice, 
however, they have continued to disappoint. The 
rate of successful complaints remains pitifully and 
unrealistically low. In the Republic of Ireland, less 
than 3 % of complaints result in a recommendation 
for some form of criminal or disciplinary action. 
In Northern Ireland, the figure is 5 %. In England 
and Wales, the figure is 12 %, while in Scotland 
it is 13 %. It should be noted that these figures 
only represent recommendations. The actual 
number of complaints that result in some form 
of criminal or disciplinary sanction is much lower. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the capacity of the 
independent procedures to deliver confidence 
in the investigation of complaints has been the 
subject of recent and sustained criticism in at least 
three of the four jurisdictions. In some instances 
the criticisms are led by the independent bodies 
themselves.
In 2012, for example, the Home Affairs Committee 
(HAC) of the United Kingdom Parliament 
conducted hearings into the operation of the 
independent Commission in response to sustained 
expressions of public concern. In a highly critical 
report published in 2013, it concluded that the 
Commission ‘is not yet capable of delivering 
the kind of powerful, objective scrutiny that is 
needed to inspire [public] confidence’ that police 
powers will not be abused (HAC 2013, para. 4). 
Earlier, in 2008, over 100 lawyers with expertise 
in police complaints resigned from the IPCC’s 
advisory body citing a range of criticisms of 
the IPCC, including bias in favour of the police 
(Davies, 2008). In the 10 years up to the death 
of Ian Tomlinson, an innocent newspaper vendor 
who died of a heart attack after being struck by 
a police officer at the scene of the ‘G20 Summit 
protest’ in London in 2009, there had been 
400 deaths following police contact. The IPCC 
is obliged to investigate such cases (Economist, 
2009). Nevertheless, not one of them has ever 
resulted in the conviction of a police officer for 
murder or manslaughter; including in the Ian 
Tomlinson case itself where the inquest jury 
returned a verdict of unlawful killing.
In the Republic of Ireland in 2013, frustration 
within the independent Ombudsman 
Commission, over its failure to investigate 
certain complaints expeditiously, boiled over in 
the form of a public row between it and senior 
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police management. The Commission took the 
unprecedented step of submitting a special 
report to the Minister arising out of its public 
interest investigation of Garda compliance with 
informant handling procedures (GSOC, 2013a). 
In it the Commission referred repeatedly to its 
dependence on Garda information and to the 
difficulties it has in accessing vital information for 
the effective discharge of its functions. It stated 
explicitly that ‘this reflected a serious weakness 
in the independent investigation of complaints’ 
(GSOC, 2013a, para. 10.3) and called into 
question ‘the effectiveness of the Ombudsman 
Commission’s oversight investigative function’ 
(GSOC, 2013a, para. 10.4). The Commission 
returned to the same subject two months 
later, expressing similar concerns arising out of 
its investigation of the Garda’s use of force in 
policing a student process (GSOC, 2013b).
Even the Police Ombudsman in Northern Ireland, 
generally considered to be the most advanced of 
the independent systems, has also been rocked 
by concerns from diverse quarters over its alleged 
lack of independence in practice. Its own chief 
executive resigned in 2011 citing frustration over 
its diminishing operational independence from 
the police. Ultimately this led to an inspection 
of the operational independence of the 
Ombudsman’s Office from the police force by the 
Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, and 
the early retirement of the Ombudsman (CJINI, 
2011). His successor was the Chief Inspector of 
the Criminal Justice Inspectorate at the time the 
inspection was carried out. The report found 
a lack of confidence within the Ombudsman’s 
office and among key stakeholders over the 
flawed nature of the investigation process used 
in a number of major cases (CJINI, 2011).
STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES
LACK OF INDEPENDENT PERSONNEL
A primary weakness affecting all of the procedures 
is that they are not as independent of the police 
as they purport to be. This is reflected at several 
levels. They all rely heavily on the recruitment of 
former and seconded police officers, often from 
the same police forces that they are investigating. 
In his research on the IPCC, OPONI and GSOC, 
Savage found that between one quarter and one 
third of investigators came from the force under 
investigation or another force (Savage, 2013a). 
The UK parliament’s Home Affairs Committee 
identified this as one of the three main causes 
of distrust in the complaints system (HAC, 2013, 
para. 13). It strongly urged the IPCC to increase 
the level of its non-police investigative resources 
(HAC, 2013, ch.5). The IPCC is currently 
implementing a recruitment training programme 
to do that.
There is no doubt that former police officers 
bring valuable skills and experience not 
otherwise readily available to the complaints 
bodies on their establishment. Equally, however, 
they will bring baggage of a tendency to see 
events and issues through the eyes of the 
officer under investigation, rather than those 
of the complainant. Even were that not to be 
the case, they suffer from the inevitable risk of 
appearing to the complainant and the public 
of being biased in favour of the police. That is 
sufficient in itself to render reliance on former 
police officers as counter-productive. Reliance 
on former police officers is also contrary to best 
human rights practice (Hammerburg, 2009). It is 
disappointing, therefore, that the Commissions 
have not managed to do more to increase the 
proportion of their investigative staff who have 
no police or police related background.
CONTINUING RELIANCE ON POLICE 
INVESTIGATION
The lack of independence is even more marked 
in the operation of the complaints process. 
Incredibly, a very large number of complaints 
continue to be investigated by serving police 
officers in the same force as the officers 
who are the subject of complaint. With the 
exception of OPONI, the legislation establishing 
the Commissions leaves large categories of 
complaints to be investigated by the police 
themselves, at least in the first instance. Moreover, 
even where the Commissions are competent 
to investigate complaints directly, they (apart 
from OPONI) frequently rely on the police to 
conduct the investigations. In the Republic of 
Ireland, the GSOC referred back to the police for 
investigation more than twice as many complaints 
as it investigated itself. Under its legislation GSOC 
must investigate all complaints concerning death 
or serious injury and complaints that, if proved, 
would constitute criminal offence. Any other 
complaint can be left to be investigated by the 
police, subject always to the possibility of the 
GSOC taking it over. Due to resource constraints, 
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however, the GSOC are actually advocating 
amending legislation to enable it, refers the 
offence cases back to the Garda for investigation 
(GSOC, 2012, para.3.6). Interestingly, the Garda 
is stoutly resisting that proposal.
Similarly, in England and Wales the IPCC directly 
investigates less than 1 % of complaints (HAC, 
2010). The remainder is referred back to the 
police for investigation, with options for the IPCC 
to supervise or manage the investigation and of 
the complainant to complain to the IPCC about 
the manner of the police investigation. That, 
however, cannot be described as an independent 
complaints system in any meaningful sense. The 
HAC was deeply critical of this operation. It was 
strongly of the view that:
‘Most cases should be investigated independently 
by the Commission, instead of referred back to 
the original force on a complaints roundabout. 
“Supervised investigations” do not offer rigorous 
oversight of a police investigation, nor do they 
necessarily give the public a convincing assurance 
that the investigation will be conducted 
objectively. This kind of “oversight-lite” is no 
better than a placebo.’ (HAC 2013, para.23)
Significantly, a relatively high number of 
complaints against the police investigation are 
upheld by the Commission (HAC, 2013, para.60.
RELIANCE ON POLICE RESOURCES
Even where complaints are investigated directly 
by the independent Commissions, it does not 
follow that the investigations are independent 
of the police. The reality on the grounds is that 
the independent investigators are often heavily 
dependent on police or police related expertise 
in the conduct of their investigations (Savage, 
2013a; HAC, 2013). This is especially true in 
cases involving fatalities or serious injury to the 
person; the very cases in which the European 
Court of Human Rights has emphasised the 
importance of the investigation being conduct 
independently of the police (Hammerburg, 
2009). The problem starts at the point where 
the incident is alleged to have occurred. The 
fact is that the Commissions do not have the 
personnel or the resources spread across the 
country to ensure that they get to the scene as 
quickly as police investigators. Almost invariably, 
therefore, they must rely on the police colleagues 
of the officers being investigated to secure the 
scene and preserve evidence. If the investigation 
requires the application of specialised skills such 
as traffic accident reconstruction, ballistics and 
even fingerprint analysis, the Commissions will 
almost invariably have to rely on the police to 
provide them as they will not normally have them 
in house. Similarly, for forensic and DNA analyses 
they normally have to rely on agencies that 
work closely with the police force in question. 
Even at a more basic level, as will be seen 
later in the context of regulatory capture, the 
independent investigators are usually dependant 
on the cooperation of the police for the supply 
of documentary, video, electronic, and/or oral 
evidence central to the investigation.
It would almost be perverse to describe 
investigations conducted in such circumstances 
as independent of the police. This is tacitly 
acknowledged by the report of the HAC inquiry 
which explicitly linked the IPCC’s capacity to 
take control of a potential crime scene with the 
quality of its investigations:
‘When the IPCC does investigate it often comes 
too late and takes too long. The trail is left to 
go cold. IPCC should be able to take immediate 
control of a potential crime scene during the 
crucial “golden hours” and early days of an 
investigation into deaths and serious injury 
involving police officers.’ (HAC, 2013, para.24)
It went on to assert that the IPCC’s involvement in 
death and serious injury cases was far too remote 
as it lacked access to independent specialists 
who could analyse a possible crime scene. This, 
in turn, meant that important cases were under 
investigated (HAC, 2013, para.33). Similarly, 
GSOC has explicitly and publicly linked its 
capacity to deliver its investigative function with 
access to the Garda PULSE and computerised 
information bases. (GSOC, 2013a, para.10.4) The 
PULSE system incorporates a central information 
database to which operational gardai input data 
on crime incidents etc. in the course of their 
duties. Garda have direct electronic access to it, 
and it is a vital resource in any investigation into 
a complaint or criminal matter. The Commission, 
however, has no independent access. It must 
depend on Garda cooperation to extract 
information from PULSE on a case by case basis. 
In a special report to the Minister in 2013, it 
tersely recommended, inter alia, that it should be 
given independent access immediately (GSOC, 
2013a, rec.21)
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LACK OF RIGOUR IN INVESTIGATIONS
Independent investigation does not always 
mean a rigorous investigation. In respect of 
serious criminal allegations, for example, it 
would appear that the police officer or officers 
concerned are not subjected to the same robust 
arrest, detention and interrogation methods that 
would apply typically to civilian counterparts. 
Instead the standard practice appears to be to 
take a statement from the officer, usually by 
appointment. One of the three causes of distrust 
in the complaints system identified by the HAC 
was that the police often do not interview officers 
after cases involving death and serious injury, 
although they would routinely do so for ordinary 
members of the public (HAC, 2013, para.13). In 
its interim report on the Hillsborough disaster, it 
found that police officers are rarely interviewed 
under caution in circumstances in which an 
ordinary member of the public would be (HAC, 
2012). In its 2013 report, it stated:
‘The issue of interviewing officers in cases 
involving death and serious injury is indicative 
of a culture of treating officers differently from 
members of the public. Where officers are not 
interviewed promptly under caution, this can 
lead to weaker evidence and loss of confidence in 
the process of investigating serious matters such 
as deaths in custody.’ (HAC, 2013, para.85)
It went on to recommend, inter alia, that officers 
should be ‘routinely interviewed under caution 
in the most serious cases, exactly as a member of 
the public would be.’ (HAC, 2013, para.85)
Savage’s research on the procedures in three 
of the jurisdictions also found evidence that 
the influence of former police investigators was 
undermining the rigour and independence of 
the procedure. They had a propensity to close 
investigations too quickly and to take a narrow 
criminal investigation approach, rather than a 
broader contextual approach which is open to 
the issues raised (Savage, 2013b). They were 
not inclined to challenge police narratives. One 
telling example cited in the research is where a 
former police officer investigator was happy to 
accept CCTV evidence provided by the police, 
while a fellow investigator from a non-police 
background wanted to check local businesses 
independently to see if there was video evidence 
that the police had not discovered or that they 
were concealing (Savage, 2013b). His fears may 
have been well founded as the GSOC has felt 
compelled recently to criticise the Garda publicly 
for impeding its investigations by suppressing 
relevant evidence and denying the existence 
of statements given by gardai who had taken 
part in the policing of a student protest that 
had generated numerous complaints (GSOC, 
2013b). In its inquiry into IPCC investigations, 
the HAC also heard extensive criticisms of, inter 
alia: a failure by investigators to locate evidence; 
a propensity to accept police explanations for 
missing evidence; failure to analyse competing 
accounts, even with inconsistencies between 
officers’ accounts or a compelling account from 
a complainant; a lack of investigative rigour; and 
delay (HAC, 2013, para.11).
REGULATORY CAPTURE
Regulatory capture is an established and common 
phenomenon in the relationship between a 
regulatory agency and the body or bodies being 
regulated (Ayre & Braithwaite, 1991). It can arise 
on at least two levels. Typically, it emerges and 
develops over time as the agency and body 
become more familiar with each other’s methods 
and practices. As agency personnel engage 
exclusively with the work of the persons they 
are regulating, there is a tendency to acquire 
the perspectives and even the language of those 
persons. This is especially so where the persons 
being regulated are experienced and hardened 
professionals in a specialist field and the 
regulators are ‘outsiders’ who have not acquired 
that direct experience. In this environment, the 
persons being regulated are in a strong position 
not just to evade the efforts of the regulators to 
control them or call them to account, but also 
to steer those efforts in ways and directions that 
will serve their interests, usually at the expense 
of the regulatory objectives. At another level, 
the regulated body might ‘capture’ the regulator 
at the outset by shaping its form, function and 
powers and/or by negotiating how it will perform 
its function.
Arguably, the police complaints systems in 
Britain and Ireland have always been the subject 
of regulatory capture at both levels from their 
inception and right through the successive 
waves of reforms. Even today, with the fully 
‘independent’ models there is evidence that 
their efficacy continues to be undermined 
by regulatory capture at both levels. This is 
reflected in a tendency for investigators to be 
unnecessarily deferential to the police. Savage 
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found that investigators tended to be ‘over-
cautious’ in their dealing with the police in 
order to avoid giving offence (Savage, 2013a). 
So, for example, they were reluctant to seize 
officers’ notebooks. Similarly, in criminal cases, 
police suspects are rarely arrested, detained and 
interrogated under caution in custody. The first 
arrest by the GSOC did not occur until December 
2012, more than five years after it commenced 
operations. Typically, an investigator will simply 
take a statement by appointment from the officer 
or officers and check it against the complainant’s 
statement and other independent evidence. 
Inconsistencies are not normally pursued through 
robust questioning. Documentary or material 
evidence supplied by the police is usually accepted 
at face value, even to the extent that investigators 
do not check independently if that is the sum total 
of evidence available. Savage also found evidence 
of ‘independent’ investigators ‘going native’, 
as reflected in their tendency to adopt police 
terminology and mindsets (Savage, 2013b).
The regulatory capture is institutionalised through 
the contents of Protocols agreed between the 
independent Commissions and the police. Typically, 
they will regulate matters such as how and the 
extent to which Commission investigators can get 
access to police records, information, intelligence 
and stations. They will also address arrangements 
for interviewing police officers. In theory they are 
aimed at facilitating smooth cooperation between 
the police and the Commissions in investigations. 
In practice, they tend to blunt the independent 
powers of the Commissions and cede excessive 
control over investigations to the police (Savage, 
2013a); sometimes to the detriment of effective 
investigation.
Instead of enhancing the smoothness and efficacy 
of investigations, the Protocols agreed between 
the Commissions and the police can actually prove 
counterproductive. The GSOC, for example, has 
voiced concerns about the capacity of the Protocols 
to blunt the independence of its oversight role. In 
a 2013 report on an investigation into the police 
handling of an informant, it complained candidly 
that ‘.. under the present Protocols, [it] is wholly 
reliant upon assurances from the [police] that 
the evidence and information they have supplied 
represents the totality of such information held. 
This leaves scope to question the completeness 
and independence of oversight.’ (GSOC, 2013a 
para. 10.2).
POLICE OBSTRUCTIONISM
Police obstructionism is also proving an enduring 
obstacle to the capacity of the independent 
Commissions to deliver effective investigations. 
Once again there is a link with the Protocols. In 
2013, for example, the GSOC took the highly 
unusual step of going public in its criticisms of 
police delay in supplying relevant information 
concerning their policing of a student protest 
that had generated multiple complaints (GSOC, 
2013b). Instead of exercising its own powers to 
seize the information directly, the Commission 
complied with the Protocols and requested its 
production from the police. The Protocols specify 
a time limit of 30 days for compliance. In the 
event it took 224 days and numerous requests 
before the police supplied any documents, and 
634 days for the Commission to get a copy of the 
parallel police investigation file on the protest.
In some situations the police actually supply false 
or misleading information. In the student protest 
investigation, for example, the police claimed 
falsely that there were no statements from 
officers who used batons on the day (GSOC, 
2013b). Similarly, police management attempted 
to conceal the availability of video evidence taken 
by police officers (GSOC, 2013b).
SHORTAGE OF RESOURCES
Underlying some of these problems is a shortage 
of resources available to the independent 
Commissions. The UK parliamentary committee, 
for example, pointed out that the resources 
available to the independent Commission for 
investigations are dwarfed by the comparable 
resources available to the police (HAC, 2013, 
para.33). Inevitably, this leaves the Commissions 
excessively dependant on the police to advance 
their investigations, and even to carry out 
the investigations. The Commission itself told 
the inquiry that it does not currently have 
sufficient resources to enable it to meet its 
statutory responsibility or the public’s growing 
expectations of its role (HAC, 2013, para.30).




When these features of the ‘independent’ 
procedures are viewed in the light of the 
outcome of complaints, it is apparent that the 
latest reforms are not working. Indeed it might 
even be questioned whether truly independent 
investigation of complaints against the police 
is a realistic prospect. Before settling for such a 
negative conclusion, however, it might be worth 
considering another cycle of reforms aimed at 
closing the gap between the appearance and 
the substance of independent investigation. 
At least for the more serious, non-service type 
complaints, the Commissions must be given the 
powers and resources to conduct investigations 
as independently of the police as is practicably 
possible. At the very least, that will require: the 
recruitment and training of more independent 
investigators; the phasing out of former police 
officers; the employment and training of personnel 
with the necessary range of specialist skills; powers 
to investigate all complaints independently; the 
renegotiation of the protocols; and the adoption 
of an institutional policy favouring direct use of 
coercive powers when police cooperation is not 
immediately forthcoming.
Ultimately, it will never be possible, or even 
desirable, to divorce the police entirely from the 
investigation of complaints against themselves. 
So, for example, there is a need for close 
cooperation between the Commissions and the 
police in the handling of service type complaints 
in a swift and non-bureaucratic manner that 
strikes a reasonable balance between the interests 
of police, public and complainants. It is unlikely, 
however, that that will be possible without public 
confidence in the manner in which the more 
serious complaints are handled.
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